

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE IMPACT OF IRREGULAR WARFARE ON THE US ARMY

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ABSTRACT

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Although the US Army has yet to clearly define irregular warfare, it is imperative that the Army must take near-term action to enhance the ability of Soldiers and units to operate effectively in an irregular warfare environment. This study will identify Soldier skills and ground force capabilities required to successfully prosecute irregular warfare, assess current/programmed capabilities against the identified requirements, and make Doctrine, Organizational, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) recommendations to enhance Army capabilities and capacity to address irregular challenges. Recommendations will include options for Army initiatives to enhance coordinated multinational and interagency operations.

THE IMPACT OF IRREGULAR WARFARE ON THE US ARMY

While United States Army doctrine has yet to clearly define irregular warfare, it is imperative that the Army must take near-term action to enhance the ability of Soldiers and units to operate effectively in an irregular warfare environment. The Soldier skills and ground force capabilities required to prosecute irregular warfare at all levels of war will differ compared to the nature of warfare that our nation has experienced during the past decades. The Doctrine, Organizational, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) construct of the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) provides a means to assess the Army's future irregular warfare requirements. After determining requirements, this study will determine shortfalls in the current strategy and provide recommendations to enhance Army capabilities and capacity to address irregular challenges. Recommendations will include options for Army initiatives to enhance coordinated multinational and interagency operations.

Irregular Warfare Defined

While many recognize the need to study irregular warfare, there is much debate over the definition of the concept. Substantively, irregular warfare is a form of conflict that pits an insurgent force or forces against a central government of a state, and/or a conflict that involves two or more insurgency forces fighting against one another. Given this broad definition, irregular warfare can clearly involve an assortment of forces, to include insurgent forces, state governmental forces, and even tribal forces. The key factor is that one or more of the warring factions represent private militias not associated with the formal armed forces of a nation state.¹ Similarly, at the second annual Irregular Warfare Conference hosted by the United States Marine Corps in July 2005, the Future Contingencies Panel, defined irregular warfare as "conflict in which some or all forces engaged (on any side) do not belong to the regular forces of legally constituted states, or employ non-traditional methods."² Recent work at the United States Army War College (USAWC) on Exercise Unified Quest 06, a four phase war game taking place from January to March 06 in which the Army Chief of Staff expects to refine proficiencies in irregular warfare, provides perhaps the clearest definition of irregular warfare.

Irregular Warfare: Armed conflict in which one or more of the adversaries are primarily using guerrilla operations, terrorism, or other irregular tactics rather than relying primarily on traditional military formations and techniques.³

Exercise Unified Quest work further identifies irregular warfare as the primary tool of an insurgency (using violence or the threat of violence to change a government's organization).

Additionally, the study recognizes that the socio-political, economic, military, and informational actions are interrelated. Irregular warfare forces often take actions for the socio-political impact rather than their direct social, economic, or military impact.⁴

Strategic Significance

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) seeks to establish a capabilities-based approach to the spectrum of strategic challenges in the 21st century. Figure 1 provides an overview of the strategic environment in order to establish a common frame of reference for the spectrum of challenges facing our nation. In the matrix, the vertical axis represents the likelihood of the various challenges, while the horizontal axis considers our nation's vulnerability to those challenges.

<i>QDR Strategic Environment</i>	
<p>Irregular</p> <p>Non-state and state actors employing unconventional methods to counter stronger state opponents. (<i>erode our power</i>)</p> <p>Examples: terrorism, insurgency, civil war, and emerging concepts like "unrestricted warfare"</p> <p><i>Likelihood: very high; strategy of the weak</i></p>	<p>Catastrophic</p> <p>Terrorist or rogue state employment of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects against American interests. (<i>paralyze our power</i>)</p> <p>Examples: attack on homeland, global markets, or key ally that would generate a state of shock and preclude normal behavior</p> <p><i>Likelihood: moderate and increasing</i></p>
<p>Traditional</p> <p>States employing military forces in well-known forms of military competition and conflict. (<i>challenge our power</i>)</p> <p>Examples: conventional air, sea, and land forces, and nuclear forces of established nuclear powers</p> <p><i>Likelihood: currently decreasing due to historic capability-overmatch and expanding qualitative lead</i></p>	<p>Disruptive</p> <p>Competitors employing technology or methods that might counter or cancel our current military advantages. (<i>capsize our power</i>)</p> <p>Examples: technological—bio, cyber, or space war, ultra-miniaturization, directed-energy, other—diplomatic blackmail, cultural or economic war</p> <p><i>Likelihood: low, but time works against the United States</i></p>

FIGURE 1

This evaluation of the strategic environment assesses that the likelihood of irregular warfare is high and that our nation's vulnerability is lower than the other strategic challenges.⁵ Over time, however, many argue that our nation's vulnerability to irregular war increases as the

nation experiences crushing financial burdens, degradation of military capability, and damage to long-standing alliances and relationships.⁶

The assessment of the Future Contingencies Panel is that irregular warfare is likely to be the most dangerous threat for the United States during the next 20-30 years. The panel attributed the increase in irregular warfare threat due to three primary conditions: a growing youth bulge in Islamic countries, failed economies with no effective fixes, and the emergence of what they term warrior cultures, like the war lords and drug lords of Somalia or Afghanistan.⁷ One of the major factors contributing to the conditions for the threat of irregular warfare is the emergence of failed states. The inability of a state nation-state to provide basic social, economic, legal, and political services and safeguards to its citizens defines a failed state. Similarly, when a state can no longer provide good governance, enforce the law and protect its citizens from crime and violence, and when it can no longer produce economic prosperity, educate and provides its citizens with health care, that state has failed.⁸ Dr. Robert H. Dorff, a previous Chairman of the Department of National Security Policy and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College and author of numerous books and journal articles focusing on U.S. national security strategy, democratization and failed states, further highlights the absence of governance as the main contributing root cause of failed states. He provides three primary components of this trend. The first is a growth of transnational crime which effectively cuts across national borders to operate regionally or globally due to sophistication and technology. Secondly, the explosive resurgence and growth of ethnic and religious conflicts fuels the pressures toward fragmentation within countries and contributes to the erosion of effective governance and public confidence in governance. Finally, the developments in economic trends, financial markets and technology further degrades the government's ability to perform the critical tasks necessary to control its populace.⁹ Further, Dr. Dorff states,

The fundamental problem of failed states is that they do not simply go away, they linger; the longer they persist, the greater the potential challenges to neighboring states, regional stability, and international peace.”¹⁰

In his book *When States Fail Causes and Consequences*, Robert I. Rotberg, a noted author on failed states and the Director of the Kennedy School of Government Program on Intrastate Conflict considers failed states more of a process than a state of nature and goes further to identify the primary failing and fragile states throughout the world today. His view of “collapsed” or failed states designate the consequences of a process of decay at the nation-state level. The capacity of “failed” nation states to perform positively for their citizens has atrophied.¹¹ In his analysis, Rotberg identifies a growing number of states that are currently

failing or fragile states.¹² Rotberg's assessment of failed and fragile states is in line with the assessment of the first Annual Failed States Index, published in the July/August issue of *Foreign Policy*. The index corroborates Rotberg's assessment by using indicators of state failure to evaluate potential problem areas. Figure 2 lists the ranking of the top twenty failed or failing states based on twelve indicators of instability.

The Failed States Index www.foreignpolicy.com			Indicators of Instability											
			Demographic Pressures	Refugees and Displaced Persons	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Development	Economic Decline	Delegitimization of State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention
1	106.0	Ivory Coast	8.0	8.0	7.7	8.8	9.0	7.7	9.8	9.5	9.4	9.0	9.1	10.0
2	105.3	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	9.0	9.4	9.0	7.0	9.0	8.0	8.0	9.0	9.1	8.7	9.1	10.0
3	104.1	Sudan	8.6	9.4	7.8	9.1	9.0	8.5	9.2	8.7	8.0	9.8	8.7	7.3
4	103.2	Iraq	8.0	9.4	8.3	6.3	8.7	8.2	8.8	8.9	8.2	8.4	10.0	10.0
5	102.3	Somalia	9.0	8.0	7.4	6.3	9.0	8.3	9.8	10.0	7.8	10.0	8.7	8.0
6	102.1	Sierra Leone	9.0	8.0	7.5	8.9	8.7	10.0	7.5	9.1	8.7	6.3	8.6	9.8
7	100.9	Chad	8.0	9.1	7.1	8.3	9.0	8.0	8.9	9.0	9.1	7.0	9.4	8.0
8	99.7	Yemen	7.8	8.0	6.4	8.2	9.0	8.8	9.8	9.3	6.4	9.0	9.4	7.6
9	99.5	Liberia	9.0	7.8	7.3	8.1	9.0	10.0	7.5	8.2	8.2	6.5	7.9	10.0
10	99.2	Haiti	8.8	8.0	7.7	3.4	9.0	8.1	9.4	9.8	8.7	7.8	8.5	10.0
11	99.0	Afghanistan	9.0	8.0	8.0	7.4	8.8	7.5	8.1	8.1	7.9	8.2	8.0	10.0
12	98.5	Rwanda	9.0	7.8	8.0	8.6	9.0	9.2	9.5	5.0	8.3	5.0	8.9	8.2
13	95.7	North Korea	8.0	6.0	7.2	8.1	9.0	9.6	9.8	9.7	9.0	8.3	8.0	3.0
14	95.0	Colombia	9.0	8.0	6.9	9.2	9.0	7.1	9.8	4.2	8.2	5.4	9.2	9.0
15	94.9	Zimbabwe	9.0	8.0	6.4	7.7	9.0	7.3	7.9	8.5	7.5	9.0	7.9	6.7
16	94.7	Guinea	9.0	6.0	6.1	10.0	9.0	4.5	9.7	7.5	8.1	8.1	9.2	7.5
17	94.3	Bangladesh	8.4	7.0	7.6	6.0	9.0	7.4	9.5	8.2	8.5	8.0	8.7	6.0
17	94.3	Burundi	9.0	7.2	7.1	3.8	8.8	7.8	7.2	9.0	8.3	7.5	8.6	10.0
19	94.2	Dominican Republic	9.0	8.0	7.1	8.5	9.0	6.8	6.8	9.6	9.2	7.0	9.2	4.0
20	93.7	Central African Republic	9.0	5.0	8.8	3.0	7.0	9.0	9.7	8.0	8.2	9.0	10.0	7.0

FIGURE 2

Figure 3 shows the corresponding global picture of potential problem areas throughout the world.¹³



FIGURE 3

The strategic significance is a world where increased globalization combined with decreased resources creates the conditions, especially in Third World countries, for the increase of irregular warfare. This emergence of failed states, combined with increased populations, create domestic anarchy due to social grievances between haves and have-nots. In addition to the violence of civil breakdowns, the dangers of opportunities that emerge in response to the breakdown of state institutions further explains why violence threatens, erupts, and intensifies.¹⁴ The combination of failed states and economies, increasing population (especially a bulge in Islamic countries), and the emergence of the warrior cultures create the conditions for an increase in irregular warfare. These challenges will have strategic implications in how our Army organizes, equips, and trains its forces over the next generation.

Managing Change

The intent of Congress is to provide an Army that can constantly change to adapt to emerging threats to national security and to the assignment of new missions that promote our country's interests at home and abroad.¹⁵ The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review further defines how the Department of Defense (DOD) needs to change its portfolio of capabilities to meet future challenges that include irregular warfare.




FIGURE 4

As Figure 4 shows, DOD is shifting its portfolio of capabilities to address irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges while sustaining the capability to meet traditional challenges.¹⁶

In order to be capable of accomplishing the full spectrum of missions required for future challenges, change includes continual modernization and development across the Army's Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) domains.¹⁷ Appendix D of TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 addresses the DOTMLPF implications of future force attributes at the macro level. The following analysis provides further thoughts on the core competencies required to combat irregular warfare, evaluates resource gaps in our current strategy, and proposes recommendations to close the gaps in the DOTMLPF domains between our current strategy and irregular warfare requirements. While the analysis will address the operational and tactical levels of warfare, the focus will remain at the tactical level.

Doctrine

In the irregular warfare construct, the adaptive nature of the enemy marginalizes the value of the traditional methodology of producing and disseminating doctrine, especially at the tactical level. The rapid change in the way that the enemy adapts his tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), requires that doctrine continually evolves to meet the changes in the nature of the way that the enemy fights. While operational doctrine needs to continue to provide a general framework for operations to provide a common ground and understanding, doctrine at the tactical level in the irregular environment needs to focus more on Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) rather than traditional orders of battle of previous enemies. Lessons learned from the United States Army's modifications to its low intensity conflict doctrine after Vietnam suggested that the Army needed to establish a systemic assessment process to ensure the validity of current doctrinal assumptions, develop an efficient process to gain organizational consensus, and rapidly transmit and disseminate doctrine to units in the field.¹⁸ Similar lessons from multiple active theaters, particularly from the insurgency in Iraq, forces the Army to adjust its doctrine development and dissemination. The traditional method of developing doctrine months or years after collating lessons learned from the field no longer effectively influences the current fight.

Doctrine Shortfalls and Recommendations

In the past, Army doctrine reinvented itself roughly on an 8-10 year cycle. The current and future pace of change requires that our Army revamp the doctrinal process in many ways to

keep pace.¹⁹ Today's Army must validate and disseminate doctrine more efficiently to combat the nature of irregular warfare. The use of existing networks and technology will allow our Army to provide production, dissemination, and validation of doctrine that is more responsive to the challenges of irregular warfare. Current and future technology provides a means for units to collaborate on enemy TTP and to develop, validate, and disseminate doctrine to the field. The recent use of web-based collaborative networks, like the 1st Cavalry Division's Cavnet during its most recent rotation to Iraq, serves as a model to demonstrate the value of this practice. The use of Cavnet allowed leaders at all levels to quickly access evolving enemy TTP as well as friendly means to combat the enemy actions. The ability to disseminate these lessons learned throughout the organization in a timely manner decreased the advantages of adaptive irregular forces.²⁰ While the need to codify overriding trends using the traditional method of doctrine development still exists, the value and usefulness of timely, relevant TTP will better arm organizations for battle in the future irregular warfare environment.

The primary recommended changes in doctrine center on changes in the doctrinal development cycle and on increased funding to close the gap between our current doctrine development and the rapid pace of change in the irregular warfare domain. The Army needs to combine its Lessons Learned organizations with doctrine development in order to provide collaborative products that are more responsive to the nature of irregular warfare. Additional funding at the Division and lower levels, will serve to improve the capability for doctrine development at the tactical level. At the operational level, the Army needs to use the same collaborative model to develop more timely joint and combined doctrine.

Organization

The Army's future organization is another key aspect that influences the resources available to combat irregular warfare. At the operational level of war, the joint and combined aspects of organizations need to provide the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with increased means to combat irregular warfare. The manner in which the nation organizes for combat must provide the latitude to build organizations tailored to the enemy and the fight at hand. Future organizations must expand beyond the rigid organizational structures of the past in order to provide the JFC with the assets necessary for success against irregular forces. United States Marine Corps Colonel (Retired) Thomas X. Hammes, considered by many in the defense community as the foremost expert in insurgent warfare, argues that it is time to recognize that future warfare will move from a purely military-technical arena to a fight that takes place across the entire range of human activity – political, economic, social, and military fields.²¹ Because

the primary national power frequently rests in the political, social or economic realms and not the military arm, future joint and combined organizations must involve the core competencies that address non-military functions such as governance, social, economic and civil infrastructure. This inclusion of interagency organizations and a commitment by all parties to a long-term approach will better provide the expertise to develop and execute the grand strategy necessary to prosecute the protracted nature of future irregular warfare.²²

In addition to providing interagency expertise, future organizations must provide an expertise to address the human networks of current and future irregular warfare. One of the major changes in irregular warfare and insurgencies over the last twenty years for both inter- and intra-group conflicts has been the evolution of human networks instead of traditional hierarchical enemy organizations. The core competencies to combat such networks require an understanding of the political, economic, and social fields by professionals across the public and private sectors.²³ These competencies again lie in the non-military domain and require a non-military expertise to augment the JFC at the operational level.

Organization Shortfalls and Recommendations

The current joint forces organization at the operational level falls short of providing the types of organizations necessary to prosecute irregular warfare. Lessons learned from Afghanistan serve as a good case in point. While numerous interagency structures attempted to integrate the efforts of various executive agencies and departments in their pursuit of foreign policy goals, in practice the structures “do little to help implement policy on the ground or deal with the overarching integration required of a joint force commander (JFC).”²⁴ The necessity to integrate interagency and non-governmental forces requires that future joint forces organize, train and deploy as teams. The case study outlined in the National Drug Control Strategy Update of 2005 provides a model for the type of organization that will better integrate national actions. As outlined in the case study, the effectiveness of the U.S. Government’s interdiction efforts in the Caribbean in 2004 was due in large part to the creative collaboration between different types of organizations to include military and interdiction fields and Federal law enforcement. Specifically, the organizational structure of the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South) served as a central command, control, communication, and intelligence center, effectively disrupting organizations that supplied an estimated 10 percent of the cocaine imported into the United States. The result of the operation was a decrease in the total flow of cocaine by roughly one-third.²⁵ This type of effective interagency organization is arguably one

of the best ways that our nation can combat the adaptive networks of transnational criminals and terrorists.

The Caribbean study provides evidence that our nation can best organize future collaborative efforts among military, state, and non-military players using the type of joint interagency template of JIATF-South. Recent efforts in Joint Publication 3-8 further define such organizational structures as Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs). The JIACG is a coordination group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military planners. The JIACG provides the combatant commander with civilian and military experts tailored to meet the requirements of a supported commander. Additionally, the JIACG provides the command with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other interagency and civilian agencies, and compliments the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level.²⁶ By establishing JIACGs within each of the COCOM staffs, our nation can achieve better integration of civilian and military actions and increased unity of effort. Military history demonstrates the value of unity of effort as a principle of war. We need to apply that same mentality to the future challenges of irregular warfare.

At the tactical level, the on-going transformation of the Army combined with the 2006 QDR decision to increase key Special Operating Forces (SOF) by one-third provides a wider variety of tools to effect the nature of irregular warfare.²⁷ The inclusion of civil-military expertise and non-kinetic assets at the brigade level better arm our Army to combat irregular warfare at the tactical level. Additionally, Dr. Stephen Biddle, noted military scholar and author and Senior Fellow in the National Security Office Council on Foreign Relations, highlights the need for an increase in the number of well-trained dismounted infantry for irregular warfare conflicts. His analysis of Operation ANACONDA recognizes that the U.S. Army's lethal precision engagement technology drives our adversaries increasingly into cover and complex terrain – which are the postures that demand the largest proportion of dismounted strength. As a result, the future demand for dismounted infantry in combat units is likely to increase.²⁸

Training

Tied directly to the way that the Army must organize for future warfare is the ability of future training programs to integrate non-traditional assets. At the operational level, training must include interagency assets in order to establish the personal relationships and understanding among extremely diverse organizational cultures. Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MREs) must exercise the integration of interagency and non-governmental assets so that the key players can effectively plan, prepare, and execute operations. Additionally, strategic and

operational level training must include regional and cultural experts in the planning process to assist in the planning process. This integration will help commanders to better identify and target key centers of gravity and decisive points during campaign planning and help operational commanders in establishing effective assessments during execution.

At the tactical level, training must expand its emphasis on the ability to build and resource irregular warfare scenarios during home station training and at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). The recent efforts at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and National Training Center (NTC) serve as good models for establishing irregular warfare scenarios. Although the JRTC traditionally focuses on low-intensity conflicts, recent efforts have further developed specific irregular warfare scenarios to prepare deploying units for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.²⁹ Similarly, the recent shift of the NTC from traditional force on force scenarios to increasingly asymmetric training scenarios clearly focuses more efforts toward irregular warfare. Instead of the brigade task force-size tank battles of the past, training focuses on smaller-unit counter-insurgency scenarios that include a wide variety of inherent irregular warfare missions and tasks to include: responding to the media, increased information operations, reaction to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), emphasis on detention operations, and realistic convoy live-fire training.³⁰ Our Army must embrace this type of non-traditional focus on the softer skills and non-traditional missions.

Training Shortfalls and Recommendations

Home station training at the tactical level must mirror the efforts at the CTCs to provide collective training opportunities for irregular warfare scenarios. In order to do so, commanders must have the flexibility in their training programs and access to the resources and facilities to allow them to create irregular warfare scenarios. Another key aspect of collective home station training that needs improvement in our Army lies in the integration of Reserve and National Guard components into regular Army training programs. Many active Divisions have Reserve or National Guard forces identified as round-out units. While training plans exist to integrate active and reserve forces in unit training programs, leaders rarely take full advantage of such training events. Increased emphasis on this type of training will serve a dual purpose. For the active units, it will provide increased exposure to the diverse personal and organizational skills that exist in Reserve and Guard forces. For the Reserve and Guard forces, integrated training will provide an opportunity to raise the training standard to that of active forces.

For individual training, plans must include extensive language and cultural training prior to deployment. A recent 1st Cavalry Division survey of junior leaders highlighted this type of

training as the most useful pre-deployment training. In the survey, leaders at all levels emphasized that such training needed to become routine training conducted over months, rather than pre-deployment training conducted weeks prior to deployment. As a result, the 1st Cavalry Division began language and cultural awareness training almost 1 year prior to its next rotation to Iraq. Additionally, the leadership has established gates for success and remedial training for those who do not meet the minimum standard. Such training will better arm soldiers at all levels to gain an understanding of the irregular environment and the implications of actions at the tactical level.³¹

Leadership and Education

The demands of future conflict will continue to place great responsibility on future Army leaders at all levels, requiring mature judgment, even while they are still gaining experience.³² Given the nature of the irregular warfare environment, our leadership and education system must focus on developing the agile leaders that the Army Chief of Staff seeks in his Pentathlete analogy for leader skills. This model seeks to develop leaders that not only possess the warrior ethos that has served our Army so well in the past, but also qualities that encompass more than just warfighting skills. The analogy challenges our Army to expand leader abilities to include creativity, adaptability, innovation, and life-long learning so that leaders can better adapt to the volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous (VUCA) environment that our Army faces today and tomorrow.³³ Central to these leader abilities is the development of mentally agile leaders.

In Chapter 6 of *The Future of the Army Profession*, John Nagl and Paul Yingling, two noted military scholars and active Army lieutenant colonels with extensive combat and staff experience, argue that mental agility is probably the most important intellectual quality that an officer possesses. By extension, one can apply that same requirement for mental agility to leaders at all levels. As our Army progresses from the conventional, predictable environment of the Cold War to the complexity of future irregular warfare, the need for mental agility increases. Not only does doctrine fall short in defining the enemy's actions, the enemy's ability in rapidly adapting his TTP further complicates the nature of warfare. To meet the more complex challenges, leaders must possess the mental agility to refuse to be constrained by rules, doctrines, or routines.³⁴ Additionally, the complex irregular warfare environment that our Army will face in the future requires this mental agility more often in much more junior leaders. In the increasingly complex environments of today, where tactical successes or failures can have strategic impacts, our junior leaders must possess the fundamentals of mental agility in order for their units to survive. To win the long-term irregular warfare battles of the future, our institutional

education and leadership systems must provide for the development of mental agility at all levels.

Tied to a requirement for mental agility by our Armed Forces is an increase in the need for increased cultural understanding and language training. Increased cultural and language capabilities will allow our forces to leverage future populations to gain actionable intelligence and co-opt the efforts of local populations and foreign armies to attack the global networks of terrorism and irregular warfare.³⁵ The recent ability to access to the Rosetta Stone Language Program through Army Knowledge On-line (AKO) provides leaders at all levels with the opportunity to learn and grow both personally and professionally. Such programs encourage the life-long learning mindset that our senior leaders aspire to. Continued emphasis of the life-long learning mindset will play a major positive role in the leadership and education of our Army in the future.

Leadership and Education Shortfalls and Recommendations

The admirable focus on lifelong learning and the CSA's focus on the development of Pentathletes establish the right mindset for leadership and education. The current shortfalls lie in the means available for leaders at all levels to gain access to knowledge. While the current method of education and leadership development through the traditional means of classroom instruction clearly provides merit and warrants continuation, the Army needs to enhance, support, and reward its ability to provide on-line education. TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 recognizes the "creation of knowledge centers configured to support professional education of leaders both at home stations and with deployed forces,"³⁶ as one of the major implications of leader development and education. Such knowledge centers maximize the use of technology by providing easy access to emerging doctrine and relevant TTP. The evolution of Army Knowledge On-line (AKO) beyond just a means for free email access to an actual knowledge center for professionals provides probably the best example of our institution's use of technology to further the Army profession. Similarly, the evolution of the Center for Army Lessons Learned websites, and other professional websites such as Companycommand.com and Platoonleader.army.mil provide leaders with virtually worldwide access to professional development, provided they have access to the internet.

The Army needs to embrace and empower the efforts to educate and develop leaders through available technological means. Too often, the institutional mindset discounts such technological efforts as invalid because such products have not met the arduous approval hurdles of the traditional education and leadership development process. The value of such

technological means lies in the easy access and frequent use by leaders within the Army. Future efforts in education and leadership development must provide the funding and structure to employ available technology to meet the rapid pace of change of the nature of irregular warfare. Buy-in and enforcement by the Army as institution will help to legitimize the admirable efforts of websites like companycommand.com. When battalion commanders build individual development plans for company commanders and platoon leaders through routine use of such available knowledge centers, our Army will better meet the education and leadership challenges required for irregular warfare or other future challenges. Inherent in this approval and dissemination process is an adequate feedback mechanism to determine relevance of education and leadership topics.

Personnel

Close links exist between the personnel aspects and many other key areas required to prosecute the long-term irregular wars of the future. Personnel cycles, career paths, and policies must provide the necessary forces to man organizations throughout all phases of the current construct that seeks to organize, train, deploy, and fight as a team. Another key aspect in the personnel field is the ability to maintain a high standard of recruits in an all-volunteer force. The increasing complexity of systems in the Army requires that the institution maintains high standards for entry. Additionally, once the Army trains Soldiers and leaders in their critical skills, leaders need to provide the resources required to retain that capability for the long-term duration in order to match the protracted nature of irregular warfare.

Personnel Shortfalls and Recommendations

The protracted nature of future irregular conflict will require a personnel strategy to match that of the enemy. Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, a retired Army officer, recently conducted a study under a Pentagon contract that concluded that the Army cannot sustain the pace of troop deployments to Iraq long enough to break the back of the insurgency. He further suggested that the realization that the overextension of the Army helped drive the Pentagon's decision to being reducing forces in Iraq. Dr. Krepinevich points to the Army's 2005 recruiting slump as evidence.³⁷ Krepinevich is not alone in his assessment. In a statement to CNN in December 2005, former NATO Commander George Joulwan agreed with the assessment of an Army stretched thin:

Whether they're broken or not, I think I would say if we don't change the way we're doing business, they're in danger of being fractured and broken, and I would agree with that.³⁸

While the overextension of the US Army in the current conflict in Iraq is understandable, the primary shortfall for future irregular warfare conflicts lies in the fact that the 2005 QDR views the Iraq conflict as an anomaly. A Pentagon official working on the top-to-bottom study noted that Iraq “is clearly a one-off,” further stating “there is certainly no intention to do it again.”³⁹ While regarding the Iraq war as an anomaly is convenient in some ways for Pentagon civilians and officers, some experts say that failure to draw broader lessons from Iraq is dangerous, especially if the U.S. military faces a new war in another hot spot such as Iran or North Korea.⁴⁰ Our nation must clearly understand that the nature of future irregular warfare will require the ability to prosecute long-term conflicts. Our personnel system will have to support that type of conflict with the most costly resources of soldiers and civilians.

Recommendations in the personnel arena center on providing the forces necessary to prosecute future irregular warfare successfully, both in the military and in the civilian world. At the operational level, our nation needs to develop a long-term strategy to enhance our interagency capability of our interagency to better resource the nature of the future conflicts that irregular warfare will present. Such enhancements will include a marked increase in the expertise necessary to provide the civil-military role inherent in rebuilding nations and re-establishing governance and basic services to torn nations. Because the current civilian force is undermanned to meet current and future requirements, this provision will likely necessitate the restructure of the career paths within the interagency community to provide adequate incentives to resource the required civilian workforce.⁴¹

At the tactical level, primarily within the military, our nation needs to increase the funding and availability of elite and regular forces required to prosecute the long-term nature of irregular warfare without stretching our military services to a breaking point. Force stabilization policies to reduce personnel turbulence will better support the lifetime training and education paradigm and provide a better trained organization. The recent 2006 QDR decision to increase Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs units, and active Duty Special Forces Battalions by one-third will also clearly assist in the ability to bring the expertise of elite forces to the future irregular warfare fight.⁴² The only caveat in the expansion is the necessity to maintain the high standard of entry and qualification for SOF and the fact that it can take years, not months, to build such a force. Similarly, the recent Army increases in initial entry and retention bonuses, that seek to increase the previous goals by 2500 soldiers for the prime recruiting and retention months of June and July, are the types of initiatives that our Army needs to man the regular Army capable of conducting the long-term wars of today and in the future.⁴³ While personnel

costs are clearly the highest bill that our nation pays to sustain a competent force, funding such costs will be arguably the most crucial factor in meeting future irregular warfare challenges.

Materiel

The Army's Future Force concept is dependent on the development and incorporation of a wide variety of advanced capabilities. TRADOC 525-3-0 outlines five families of materiel capabilities that are particularly important: advanced Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) networked capabilities, logistics transformation, advanced strategic and operational lift, precision munitions and advanced fire control, and Future Combat systems.⁴⁴ Of these families of materiel capabilities, three in particular, advanced strategic and operational life, precision munitions and advanced fire control, and logistics transformation will provide our Army with the responsiveness and means to deploy and sustain operations in the expeditionary mindset of our future force. While these capabilities are clearly necessary for the prosecution of irregular warfare, they will likely not be the deciding factors. The capabilities of Future Combat Systems, combined with advanced C4ISR networked capabilities, will arguably prove to be more significant in prosecuting future irregular warfare. In these two areas, the ability to "see ourselves" and "see the enemy," will become more complicated due to the asymmetric nature of the irregular warfare battlefield.

Materiel Shortfalls and Recommendations

While the current materiel capabilities of the U.S. military clearly outmatch the rest of the world's militaries, the nature of irregular warfare marginalizes the relative strength of materiel capabilities due to the often asymmetric nature of the battlefield. The primary materiel shortfalls on the future irregular warfare battlefield will center on the inability to achieve a common operational picture among the wide variety of multinational and multi-agency forces involved in future conflicts. Future efforts in these areas must provide a means to field systems that are interoperable among a wide variety of friendly forces, to include conventional, unconventional, joint, interagency, and potentially contracted forces and coalition forces on the battlefield. Future Combat Systems and C4ISR capabilities must provide the means to achieve a common operational picture with increased fidelity. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) each provide examples that highlight the materiel shortfalls. During OEF, the lack of common blue force tracking systems between conventional and SOF forces caused potential fratricide and situational awareness concerns.⁴⁵ The wide variety of military,

interagency, non-governmental, and coalition forces that will potentially participate in future irregular warfare conflicts further complicate the ability to “see ourselves” on the battlefield.

In addition to the technical challenges to “see ourselves” on irregular warfare battlefields of tomorrow, the nature of the way that the enemy fights on the irregular warfare battlefield also marginalizes our nation’s C4ISR capabilities. The asymmetric nature of the irregular warfare battlefield, combined with the enemy’s ability to blend in to the environment, creates challenges that can potentially overcome pure technological solutions. While technology will play a role in seeing the enemy, future C4ISR systems will require increased capabilities to integrate Human Intelligence (HUMINT) from a wide variety of sources.

Recommendations to meet the future challenge of establishing the most useful common operational picture among friendly forces center on improving the ability of our nation to field technical solutions to all key players on the battlefield and to better integrate and disseminate non-technical means of situational awareness. To achieve increased situational awareness, friendly forces must have the capability to provide blue force tracking capabilities to all of the key players on the irregular warfare battlefield. While fielding interoperable service systems is a challenge, the joint approval process for funding future systems will ensure compatibility among military forces.⁴⁶ The success of blue force tracking between the Army and the Marine Corps during OIF serves as a positive example of the ability to achieve this type of integration.⁴⁷ Fielding such technical capability to the many other players on the irregular warfare battlefield will prove to be much more difficult. In order to cope with the problem, commanders at all levels will require an abundance of systems to equip, train, and support interagency, non-governmental, contract personnel, and coalition forces with the same type of blue force tracking capability. Only then will future forces achieve the required fidelity in the ability to “see ourselves” in the irregular warfare environment.

While purely technical solutions will help to achieve increased situational awareness, the nature of the irregular warfare environment will likely always require a means to integrate non-technical information in order to achieve a true joint, interagency and multi-national common operational picture. While the non-technical means of HUMINT and other manual inputs to situational awareness and intelligence may provide the source, the use of a networked, collaborative means of disseminating such information across an organization will assist in the situational understanding of such non-technical data. Future materiel efforts to provide networked capabilities among operations centers at all levels will arguably best provide this integration of non-technical information. Increased funding to provide the means to equip and support units with this type of collaborative networked capability will prove instrumental to

managing the non-technical nature of irregular warfare. In his October 2003 testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on Lessons Learned from OIF, ADM Giambastiani stated, "Essential to the power of adaptive planning and execution is our ability to conduct large scale, vertical and horizontal collaboration."⁴⁸

A final significant aspect in fielding of technical and non-technical solutions lies in the training and support to implement the solutions among a wide variety of relevant players. Technology alone is not the entire answer. In order to implement sound, holistic solutions to solve the common operational picture challenges of irregular warfare, our forces will require aggressive, realistic training.⁴⁹ To ensure success in fielding materiel to support joint and combined operations, our Army must apply the same rigorous training principles developed throughout the 1980s and 1990s to the irregular warfare environments of tomorrow. This training mindset must expand to include the integration of all of the key players on the diverse irregular warfare battlefield.

Facilities

Facilities directly support the ability to train at all levels. At the operational and strategic level, our nation must possess the computer-simulation facilities to improve the quality of training for joint and combined staffs in irregular warfare scenarios. At the tactical level, facilities must provide commanders with the flexibility to adapt training scenarios to the rapidly changing nature of irregular warfare.

Facilities Shortfalls and Recommendations

The primary shortfall at the operational level is the lack of first-class joint and combined training facilities to support the Global War on Terrorism and the joint and combined nature of future irregular warfare. While efforts at a U.S. Joint Forces Command's (JFCOM) Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) clearly provides such first class facilities within the Continental United States (CONUS), the nature of future irregular warfare will require the extension of such training opportunities to multi-national partners. The manual Master Events List (MEL)-driven Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MREs) of Afghanistan's International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) staffs serve as a case in point to this shortfall. While MEL-driven training events provided value-added training for the multi-national staffs, the marginal facilities and inadequately prepared supporting trainers fell short of providing optimal training to the staffs. Specifically, the time to develop and support manual MEL-driven ISAF MREs at austere training facilities required a longer training window that most training support staffs could not support in terms of training time available. As a result, most ISAF staffs fell short of reaching full

operational capability during MREs and had to continue training in theater to reach the level of proficiency required for daily operations.

Increasing the funding for JFCOM's Joint Force Training community, which has the mandate to integrate multinational and interagency partners, will better achieve the training results required to support the increasing number of multinational staffs required to support future irregular warfare on a global basis.⁵⁰ As the number of multinational staffs increase, clearly indicating supporting staff prioritization by the responsible training headquarters will serve to fix many of the resourcing problems. Another costly but necessary option at least for the near-term, lies in JFCOM providing the necessary training expertise and instrumentation, and experimentation to support major operations and exercises that support the global war on terror (GWOT). JFCOM's recent efforts in support of Multinational Experiment 4 (MNE 4) provide a prime example of JFCOM's global influence in such exercises and the impact on future irregular challenges. MNE 4 will combine the efforts of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States to explore the uses of international power to influence the behavior of adversaries. Insights from MNE-4 will inform joint, interagency and multinational operations while transforming future military operations.⁵¹ While costly, funding such efforts allows U.S. forces to have direct input into the quality of training throughout the world and take the necessary lead in training for future irregular challenges.

The effects that facilities have on training at the tactical level are similar to the operational and strategic level. Continued resourcing of our CTCs is an important aspect of maintaining our tactical edge in the future. The development of the CTCs in the past two decades established a truly professional tactical training capability that is unmatched in the world. CTCs possess the staffs, cadre, visibility and time to push the envelope of training to a higher standard. By continuing to resource the CTCs, our nation will better match the ever-changing TTPs of irregular warfare and provide our tactical units with a quality test and self-examination of their skills.

While continued resourcing of CTCs is important, providing adequate facilities at home station is arguably more significant due to the increased frequency of use by training units in comparison to the CTCs. Because the nature of irregular warfare is constantly changing and adapting, base training facilities must provide local commanders with the flexibility to change range scenarios rapidly in order to adapt to current enemy scenarios. This capability will likely require a move away from the multi-million dollar, computerized range complexes of the past towards generic facilities that unit leaders can tailor to a wide variety of scenarios. Often

training facilities that provide such flexibility need not rely heavily on lavish computerized systems. More important is the availability of range capabilities to support a wide variety of training scenarios. Another key aspect to flexibility is a more responsive range support system that can change range scenarios in a timely manner. A key element in responsive range support is the need for the Army to invest in developing a competent pool of range support personnel. Providing higher wages and continuous education to range support personnel will arguably result in a higher level of competence and retention of these critical assets for unit training. An increased adaptability and flexibility in range scenarios and the availability of a competent cadre of range support personnel will require an increase in range support budgets.

In addition to ranges, other key aspects of training facilities may include use of local and interagency law enforcement facilities to improve the relationship between military and law enforcement and interagency organizations. Another key aspect of training facilities will include the availability of sites to conduct urban operations. The 2006 QDR highlights the need for developing and maintaining urban warfare capabilities to defeat future irregular warfare threats.⁵² Maintaining the urban capabilities will require routine use of quality urban training facilities in order to sustain the extremely perishable individual and collective tasks associated with urban warfare. The current state of the relatively few existing urban training facilities within CONUS and OCONUS, combined with an increasing need for the use of such facilities, will necessitate increased funding to meet the demands for urban warfare training.⁵³ While the need for state of the art facilities such as Fort Polk's Shughart-Gordon site, or Fort Benning's McKenna MOUT site still exist, local commanders also need the means to quickly construct temporary urban training sites on virtually any training or live-fire range. Much like the generic, flexible range capability described earlier, post training budgets should increase funding for a mobile, modular means to build a variety of urban training sites for both blank and live fire training. Frequently, such temporary sites depict the types of structures that units will find on the irregular warfare battlefield better than do the state of the art urban sites. Having access to such capabilities would close the gap between the limited supply of urban facilities and the increasing demand for urban training and provide local commanders with more flexibility to adapt an urban site to his training objective.

Conclusion

It is clear that the Army must take near-term action that will have long-term effects to enhance the ability of Soldiers and units to operate effectively in an irregular warfare environment. The nature of irregular warfare requires different Soldier and civilian skill sets at

all levels of war to prosecute the protracted nature of future irregular warfare. This study defined irregular warfare and its strategic significance in the future. By clearly identifying the Soldier skills and ground force capabilities required to prosecute irregular warfare, the study assessed current and programmed capabilities against the identified requirements using the TRADOC Doctrine, Organizational, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLFP) model. The primary aim of this analysis sought to outline the DOTMLFP recommendations to enhance Army capabilities and capacity to address irregular challenges. Of primary importance are those recommendations for Army initiatives to enhance coordinated multinational and interagency operations at all levels of war to meet the challenges of the irregular warfare environment. The nature of irregular war requires the integration and coordination of multi-national and interagency organizations at all levels to combat the networks of the irregular warfare enemy. Funding and improvements across the DOTMLFP areas that directly or indirectly support that coordination and integration deserve a higher level of scrutiny and priority. Although all recommendations focus on the irregular warfare environment, the nature of the recommendations will serve to improve our nation's ability to combat other future challenges.

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